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INTRODUCTION TO ROBERT A. PASCAL’S 
MEMORANDUM: THE CODE AS A TEXTBOOK AND A 
RULE BOOK 
Olivier Moréteau∗ 
In 1978, Professor Alain Levasseur asked Professor Robert A. 
Pascal, then his colleague on the Louisiana State University (LSU) 
law faculty, to express in writing his thoughts regarding the organi-
zation of the Louisiana Civil Code and the explanatory material that 
appears in it. Pascal produced a short Memorandum that we publish 
today as a rediscovered treasure. This Memorandum was written 
two years before Pascal’s retirement. It was shared with Dr. Agustín 
Parise during his time at LSU, and we are grateful to both Levasseur 
and Parise for offering it for publication.  
Robert A. Pascal studied law at the Loyola University College 
of Law in New Orleans and served during the summer 1938 as a 
Research Assistant at LSU. A graduate from Jesuit High School in 
New Orleans, he received a liberal education at Loyola. In law 
school, the study of the Louisiana civil law became a passion. He 
published his first article in 1938, in the first issue of the Louisiana 
Law Review,1 and his Recollections of a Life Studying and Teaching 
Law came out 72 years later.2 
He first collaborated with the Louisiana State Law Institute 
(LSLI) on its creation in 1938, working on the Compiled Edition of 
the Louisiana Civil Codes. He later became a consultant on trust law 
revision, an area of jurisprudence where his thoughts are at the fore-
front. He also taught and produced significant work on conflict of 
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 1. Robert A. Pascal, Comment, Duration and Revocability of an Offer, 1 LA. 
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 2. ROBERT A. PASCAL: A PRIEST OF RIGHT ORDER 25-95 (Olivier Moréteau 
ed., 2018). 




laws, family law, matrimonial regimes, civil and Anglo-American 
legal science, and philosophy of law.  
In 1940, he was the first person ever to be awarded a Master’s 
degree in Civil Law at LSU. He practiced law in New Orleans for 
one year, and in 1942, added an LL.M. from the University of Mich-
igan Law School. After serving as a Coast Guard District Legal Of-
ficer during World War II, he joined the LSU law faculty. In spring 
1951, he taught trust law at the University of Chicago. In 1951–1952 
and in 1963–1964, he was a Fulbright lecturer and taught U.S. pri-
vate law and comparative law at the University of Rome, in Italian. 
In 1955, he was made full professor at LSU and never left the Law 
School even after his retirement in 1980, keeping an office as a Pro-
fessor Emeritus. Many remember his tournament with Tulane Pro-
fessor Rodolfo Batiza, Pascal insisting that the ancestor of the Lou-
isiana Civil Code (the Digest of 1808) was Spanish in substance and 
French in form—a “Spanish girl in French dress,” as he later com-
mented.3  
Pascal died in 2018, at the age of 102. He marked generations of 
students and colleagues and is remembered as a man of faith and 
uncompromising views. Whether or not one embraces his vision of 
the law as legal order, of mankind as a community of men under 
God, with the ontological obligation to respect and cooperate with 
one another, whether or not one endorses his strong preference for 
the civil law and its codification, he left an important legacy at LSU, 
in Louisiana, and in worldwide jurisprudence and civil law scholar-
ship. 
The Memorandum paved the way to Pascal’s Tucker Lecture 
given at LSU twenty years later and published in the Louisiana Law 
Review.4 It is a pure sample of both the thinking and writing of Rob-
ert A. Pascal. I have published a selection of his articles in a volume 
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titled Robert Anthony Pascal, A Priest of Right Order.5 Had I known 
of the present Memorandum, I would have invited Pascal to include 
it in the volume.6 He might have objected that, as the Memorandum 
goes saying, it was written without revision and editing, using the 
French word impromptu. Yet it is pure Pascal in the sense that it is 
crisp and to the point, with no word to be removed without a loss of 
meaning.  
The Memorandum, though very short, speaks volumes of what 
the experience of the codification of the civil law in Louisiana is, in 
a state otherwise controlled by the common law and dominated by 
the United States culture. The section discussing the tripartite organ-
ization of the Code, which follows the model of the Institutes by 
Gaius and the French Civil Code, is remarkable in the sense that it 
gives a 20th or 21st century rationale to a structure that was adopted 
by pure convenience. Pascal explains that Part I (Of Persons) and 
Part II (Things and the Different Modifications of Ownership) pro-
vide the core of imperative law, whereas Book III (Of the Different 
Modes of Acquiring the Ownership of Things) is more suppletive in 
content, though not devoid of public order limitations. Pascal ad-
mits, however, that Book III could be better organized, but makes 
limited suggestions to this effect. In his Tucker Lecture, he disap-
proved of the 1991 addition of a Book IV to the Code (Conflict of 
Laws),7 which this volume of the Journal of Civil Law Studies pub-
lishes for the first time in a trilingual version.8 His structural analysis 
of the Code is uncommon in the literature and was further elaborated 
on in his Tucker Lecture.9  
 
 5. PASCAL, supra note 2. 
 6. I had asked him to do the first selection and we discussed the arrangement 
of chapters.  
 7. Pascal, supra note 3, at 303. Pascal taught Conflict of Laws during many 
years and was of the opinion that that branch of the law does not belong in the 
Civil Code.  
 8. Olivier Moréteau & Mariano Vitetta, Trilingual Louisiana Civil Code, 
Book IV: Conflict of Laws in English, French, and Spanish, 13 J. CIV. L. STUD. 
351 (2020). 
 9. Pascal, supra note 3, at 304-305. 




This first section also expresses a call for prudence regarding 
code reform. A reason why Pascal worried about law reform con-
nects to the fact that the legislative system of the State of Louisiana 
makes it easy for individual legislators to introduce a bill and have 
it discussed and adopted without much discipline and quality con-
trol. Though the LSLI prepares the Code revision and other signifi-
cant legislation,10 it is an outside agency that does not control the 
work of the Legislature. Many a private bill introduced is the out-
come of active lobbying and coincides “with clients’ and constitu-
ents’ vested interests and other desires”11 rather than a shared sense 
of the public good, which permeated Pascal’s teaching and scholar-
ship. Pascal also complained about the work of the LSLI, where law-
yers are overrepresented, which is also conducive of the risk men-
tioned above. He wished that the Council of the LSLI would be open 
to a larger cross-section of society.12  
Part II and III of the Memorandum discuss the presence of ex-
planatory material in the Code, a point of great interest for the con-
temporary reader. According to Pascal, the view that “rules alone 
belong to legislation and that the reason for the rules belong to doc-
trine” (he refers to Portalis) may be suitable “for a people with a 
tradition in which doctrinal opinion has been and is recognized as 
the law behind the law.”13 By contrast, in Louisiana, the judiciary is 
very strong due to common law influence and local doctrine is 
weaker than in Europe and is a more recent development. Pascal 
writes that “the Code must be, more than it ever was before, a text-
book as well as a rule book.”14 The French encyclopedia influence 
 
 10. Created by La. Act 166 of 1938; see William E. Crawford, The Louisiana 
State Law Institute—History and Progress, 45 LA. L. REV. 1077 (1985); William 
E Crawford & Cordell H. Haymon, Louisiana State Law Institute Recognizes 70-
Year Milestone: Origin, History and Accomplishments, 56 LA. B.J. 85 (2008). 
 11. Memorandum, Section I.  
 12. Pascal, supra note 3, at 323: “the governing council [of the LSLI] should 
be re-composed to include educated nonlawyers: philosophers, theologians, social 
workers, economists, educators and ordinary people.” 
 13. Memorandum, Section II. 
 14. Id. 




on the drafting of earlier versions of the Louisiana Civil Code was 
recently exposed in this Journal,15 and Pascal advocates for more 
explanatory articles, due to the lack of “respect for learning in law”16 
in Louisiana.  
The third and final section of the Memorandum that Pascal calls 
a lagniappe17 denounces the current practice of publishing com-
ments together with the text of revised or new Code articles: “fre-
quently they tie the law to previous law or jurisprudence, and pro-
vide a million pegs for false argument.”18 He also regrets the exist-
ence of titles in front of every article, which are not part of the law.19 
Comments and article titles are distractors that interrupt the flow of 
the reading and make each code article look like an isolated statute, 
departing from the logic of a code that should be regarded as a 
whole.20  
The Memorandum is pessimistic, as Pascal was not convinced 
that the State of Louisiana had sufficient resources to make sound 
code reform, in which case he advocates abstention rather than revi-
sion. He, however, projects the optimistic vision that “the ambition 
in Louisiana should be to have a good workable Civil Code, in con-
tent and in form.”21 This remark alone makes the Memorandum 
treasurable.  
 
 15. Seth S. Brostoff, The Encyclopedist Code: Ancien Droit Legal Encyclo-
pedias and Their Verbatim Influence on the Louisiana Digest of 1808, 13 J. CIV. 
L. STUD. 33 (2020). 
 16. Memorandum, Section II. 
 17. DICTIONARY OF LOUISIANA FRENCH, AS SPOKEN IN CAJUN, CREOLE, 
AND AMERICAN INDIAN COMMUNITIES, at Lagniappe, meaning 2: “A little some-
thing extra received for free.” (Albert Valdman & Kevin J. Rottet ed., 2009). 
 18. Memorandum, Section III. 
 19. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1:13 9 (A) Headings to sections, source notes, and 
cross references are given for the purpose of convenient reference and do not con-
stitute part of the law. (B) The keyword, one-liner, summary and adjoining infor-
mation, abstract, digest, and other words and phrases not contained in the section 
or sections of the bill following the enacting clause do not constitute part of the 
law. (Amended by Acts 2006, No. 826, §1.) 
 20. The author of this introduction follows Pascal’s recommendations in pub-
lishing the Louisiana Civil Code in English, French and soon Spanish without 
article titles and revision comments: see Center of Civil Law Studies, Louisiana 
Civil Code Online, LSU Law, https://perma.cc/9VAP-DC4R. 
 21. Memorandum, Section III. 
 
 
A MEMORANDUM ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE 
CIVIL CODE AND EXPLANATORY MATERIAL  




FROM: Professor Robert A. Pascal 
 
TO: Professor Alain Levasseur 
 
SUBJECTS: I. Organization of the Civil Code 
    II. Explanatory Material in the Civil Code 
   III. Comments and Article Titles 
 
The remarks that appear under the first two headings are made 
at your request. Those that appear under the third are lagniappe, but 
I consider them equally important. Please understand that I am writ-
ing without revision or editing, and impromptu. You may, neverthe-
less, use these remarks, with acknowledgment, as you see fit.  
I. ORGANIZATION OF THE CIVIL CODE 
I recommend retention of the tripartite division of the Civil Code 
into books on Persons, Things, and Acquisition [and Loss] of 
[Rights and Obligations as to] Things.  
The first reason, though not the most weighty, is that the Loui-
siana bench, bar, and legislature are not so knowledgeable in law as 
to be able to accept more than minor changes in the traditional struc-
ture. Changes there may be, but they must not appear to be radical 
in form. Indeed, I believe them more ready to accept drastic changes 
in substance (especially where they coincide with clients’ and con-
stituents’ vested interests or other desires) than they are to accept 
changes in appearances or form. 




More important to me is that the tripartite division does corre-
spond to and give evidence of certain facts of our legal science and 
of our extra-legal criteria for the civil law portion of our legal order.  
Book I is concerned with Persons, the subjects of the law and 
the non-patrimonial rights and obligations between them. Book II 
treats of the interests persons may have in Things (including cred-
its), the objects of the law; and Book III deals with the manner in 
which patrimonial rights and obligations arise and terminate. If the 
next Civil Code’s form does not itself evidence this analysis, Loui-
sianians will never notice it, and if doctrinaires attempt to teach it, 
they will ignore it. As I will observe in more detail hereafter, the 
Louisiana Civil Code must explain itself as much as possible. It must 
teach the law’s science and philosophy as well as expound the legal 
rules. A functional organization (e.g., in terms of a number of titles 
on different subjects) would, I believe, lead to our people desiring 
to make each title complete in itself and make improbable the eco-
nomical statement of the civil law in terms of principles and general 
rules applicable to many areas of the law.  
Books I and II, I may observe, provide the core of imperative 
law; Book III, on the other hand, represents primarily the area of 
suppletive law. Stated in another fashion, Books I and II declare mat-
ters of public order character; Book III, on the other hand, is con-
cerned largely with the civil law of private order character, the rights 
and obligations that can be contracted and those that, though not 
contracted (e.g., delictual obligations) can be the object of compro-
mise. There are exceptions to this primary notion of Book III 
throughout its length, to be certain, but they are incidental to the 
main theme. Thus, though succession is primarily testamentary, 
there are public order limitations (e.g., on donations to the prejudice 
of forced heirs or in favor of others, such as those to certain illegiti-
mates and concubines, where the effect might be family discord or 
the revelation of scandal; on restrictions in marriage contracts for 
good domestic peace and order; on certain forms required for cer-
tainty as to the intent of the actor; on occupancy and acquisitive 




prescription; on liberative prescription; and on the ranking of credits 
in the event of insufficiency of assets). But all these public order 
limitations belong in Book III because Book III is concerned with 
the acquisition and loss of patrimonial rights.  
In similar fashion, Books I and II contain some matters that ap-
pear to be in the private order sphere. But here again the appearance 
is deceptive, for public order is at the root. Thus persons must con-
sent freely to marriage, but may not vary the personal relationship 
of matrimony. (Note that the matrimonial regime, the object of the 
marriage contract as to patrimonial affairs is in Book III.) Parents 
may name tutors to their children, but are not at liberty to vary the 
powers and duties of the tutor. The parental right of enjoyment and 
that of administering the minor’s patrimony are only incidentally 
patrimonial rights and more directly personal rights growing out of 
the natural interdependence of family members that the Code re-
spects. Servitudes can arise on convention, but the essential nature 
of a servitude cannot be changed. The Code defines the limits of 
status rights and obligations and provides the bounds of rights in 
things.  
It is true that Book III itself could be refined in its arrangement. 
Indeed, perhaps Articles 1760 and 2292, which tell us so eloquently 
that there are two sources of [rights and] obligations—conventions, 
or more broadly, voluntary juridical acts, and the law—could be 
placed at the head of the Book, or better yet, moved to the Prelimi-
nary Title so that it might be seen that the sources of right and obli-
gation are three: convention, custom, and law, the first being limited 
only and then only as public order demands it, and the last encom-
passing such laws as those on status relationships, permissible kinds 
of interests in things, patrimonial situations demanding adjustments 
(e.g., enrichment without cause), unsolicited acts of cooperation (ne-
gotiorum gestio), and wrongful acts causing damage or injury.  
 Certainly it would be well to set out rules applicable to all obli-
gations; sate clearly the general rules on the sources of obligations 
that have in common the act of man (convention unilateral will, 




cooperative act, wrongful act); collect together the institutions on 
the discharge of obligations; and separate out the rules of (1) transfer 
of things, (2) their original acquisition, and (3) their acquisition by 
prescription. But I would keep all this in Book III.  
II. EXPLANATORY MATERIAL IN THE CIVIL CODE 
Even Portalis, I believe, said that rules alone belong in legisla-
tion and that the reasons for the rules belong to doctrine. This may 
be very well indeed for a people with a tradition in which doctrinal 
opinion has been and is recognized as the law behind the law. An-
glo-Americans do not have this, have not had it since the Tudors, 
and in this century have sought to avoid it—as witnessed by realism 
first, then policy science, and the otherwise inarticulated cult of “ad-
vocacy” as characterized by the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity. Our Louisiana lawyers and judges are infected with the disease, 
as the case of Justice Tate so well demonstrates. If the rules of law 
are to be made less avoidable, therefore, the reason for their being 
must be in texts enacted as law. The Code must be, more than it ever 
was before, a textbook as well as a rule book. Without this charac-
teristic of the Codes of 1825 and 1870, the civil law in Louisiana 
would have been more perverted than it is now. My regret is that 
these Codes did not go far enough.  
Think of the advantage of articles explaining why alimony rules 
must be considered rules of public order; why the differentiation of 
the rights of legitimates and ordinary illegitimates and incestuous 
and adulterous illegitimates must be made so as to maintain peace 
in families, avoid destructive partitions of family homes and enter-
prises, and avoid scandal; why the patrimonial affairs of a family 
should be under one management; why no person should be allowed 
to interdict another through limitations on a transfer to him; why 
prescription must not be waived in advance; or why the will of one 
who has alienated a thing should not have the power to control its 
use and disposition.  




It should be recognized that those of us who know better must 
protect the people against even so-called law professors who know 
no more than what judges tell them, or, for one reason or another, 
seek to communicate no more to their students. If the raison d’être 
of the law is in the legislation, it will not be avoided so easily. Lou-
isiana’s situation is not that of a civilian jurisdiction with a respect 
for learning in law and this must not be forgotten.  
III. COMMENTS AND ARTICLE TITLES 
In my judgment, there must be no publication whatsoever of 
what the drafters of articles or the legislators themselves conceived 
the meaning of the articles to be. Comments theoretically are not 
law, but they are in fact embellishments that swell the bulk of the 
verbiage that must be consulted for drafters’ or legislators’ intent, 
frequently they tie the law to previous law or jurisprudence, and pro-
vide a million pegs for false argument. If something must be said to 
explain a law, the law is not stated clearly. If Louisiana does not 
have a people competent enough to write legislation, then a Code 
revision project must not be entertained.  
Comments, besides, break the practical continuity of a Code. 
The reader no longer reads the articles as convenient segments of a 
larger exposition of the plan of order for the subject at hand, but 
rather as isolated statutes. The same observation applies to article 
titles, though to a lesser degree. In my judgement, within any chap-
ter or similar division of the Code, nothing should interfere with the 
reading of the chapter as a whole, and nothing should so direct the 
reader’s attention to one or a few particularly relevant provisions. 
The Code must be written so that the reader will be forced to read 
all the articles on the topic to make certain he has read all he should.  
May you see the light. The ambition in Louisiana should be to 
have a good workable Civil Code, in content and in form. We must 
not innovate simply to show that we can, or to imitate others whose 
juristic backgrounds and habits are different from ours. We must 




seek an instrument with content and form that will improve our civil 
order and facilitate its appreciation and its application.  
 
 
